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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3055
___________
MICHAEL RINALDI,
              Appellant
vs.
T. SNIEZEK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-0679)
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 26, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 11, 2008)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Michael Rinaldi appeals pro se from an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas petition filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
2In 1999, Rinaldi was convicted of various drug and firearms offenses,
including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute in excess of five
kilograms of cocaine.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 922(g)(1). 
He was sentenced to 248 months in prison.  His direct appeal was unsuccessful.  Rinaldi
next filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied on the
merits.  In September 2003, we denied his request for a certificate of appealability. 
Thereafter, Rinaldi unsuccessfully pursued relief via motions filed under Rules 60(b) and
59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, and an application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. 
Rinaldi filed another § 2241 petition in April 2008, raising only an “actual
innocence” claim.  In support of this claim, Rinaldi relied on portions of the trial
transcript and affidavits from “numerous witnesses who each state petitioner was not
involved in the charged conspiracy.”  The District Court dismissed the § 2241 petition
without prejudice because Rinaldi had not shown that § 2255 was an inadequate or
ineffective remedy for his claim.  Rinaldi filed a timely motion for reconsideration,
arguing that he should be permitted to raise an actual innocence claim based on an
intervening change in the law after he filed his § 2255 motion.  The District Court denied
the reconsideration motion and Rinaldi filed this appeal.
A § 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for
a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.  See Davis v.
3United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974).  A habeas petitioner can seek relief under 28
U.S.C.   § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of [the] detention.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 5.  A § 2255 motion is not
“inadequate or ineffective” merely because the petitioner can not meet the stringent gate
keeping requirements of § 2255, Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.
2002), or because the sentencing court does not grant relief, Cradle v. United States ex
rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  Rather, the “safety valve”
provided under § 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply only in unusual
situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his
conviction for a crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law. 
See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
We agree with the District Court that Rinaldi has not demonstrated such a
limitation in § 2255’s scope or procedure here.  While he claims that he has presented
newly discovered evidence that demonstrates his innocence, this evidence solely consists
of trial transcripts and witness affidavits.  Of course, the testimony was available at trial. 
In addition, Rinaldi does not argue, and there is no indication, that the information in the
affidavits was unavailable at trial.  Finally, the District Court properly denied Rinaldi’s
motion for reconsideration because he did not identify an intervening change in the law
that prevented him from raising an actual innocence claim in his first § 2255 motion.
4Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, see I.O.P. 10.6.,
we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
